Abstract
Introduction
Football banning orders (FBOs) are court-issued, preventative orders that impose a number of restrictive conditions on an individual who has (a) previously been involved in football-related disorder and (b) is likely to be involved in disorder in the future (Moss, 2009) . At their simplest, FBOs aim to prevent future disorder by banning individuals from attending specified matches for a set period of time, though they also belong to a broader family of legislative innovations that emerged in the UK in the late 1990s (Moss, 2009; Zedner, 2009 ). Anti-social behaviour orders (ASBOs) represent the most high profile of such innovations, which primarily aim to prevent specific populations from engaging in particular types of behaviours (see Squires, 2008) . These preventative orders are commonly labelled as 'hybrid' in that they can be issued on top of a sentence resulting from a criminal conviction, or they can be issued through a civil application process, where the qualifying misbehaviour need not be established with a criminal standard of proof but only with the lesser civil standard (e.g. on the balance of probabilities) (Moss, 2009 ). However, breach of such orders, even when they are issued as part of a civil process, can result in a criminal conviction.
In their current form FBOs were introduced into England and Wales in 2000, but were not extended to Scotland until the Police, Public Order and Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act of 2006. As Nixon et al. (2010) note this type of policy transfer has become more common as legislators are keen to draw upon lessons and good practice from other jurisdictions. With the establishment of a devolved Scottish Parliament at Holyrood in 1999 -and the ceding of limited legislative and policy making powers from Westminster to Holyrood -the variety of ways in which policy transfer can occur between England and Scotland have increased in number and complexity. Legislation can still be effectively imposed by Westminster in some areas, whilst in others legislation may be copied or significantly adapted by Holyrood (Keating et al., 2003) . Even where legislation is transferred to Scotland with similar drafting and shared objectives, the application of that legislation in a Scottish context can lead to significant deviation or innovation. For instance, ASBOs, a similar type of hybrid order to FBOs, were introduced across the UK in the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act. However, in Scotland ASBOs were both resisted and significantly subverted as practitioners steered the policy agenda away from the imposition of punitive orders towards other interventions focussing more on the root causes of anti-social behaviour (Nixon et al., 2010) No previous research has examined the transfer of the FBO legislation from the English to the Scottish context. This is somewhat surprising for two principal reasons. Firstly, the composition of Scottish football is different to English football. In total, 92 professional clubs operate in England and Wales. They play in four divisions (The Premiership, Championship, League One and League Two) and in 2010-11, 30% (n=28) of all English teams had average attendances of over 20,000. Although, 42 clubs operate in Scotland across four divisions, 1 (The Scottish Premier League (SPL), Leagues One, Two and Three) the professional game is dominated by Rangers and Celtic, whose average attendances are over three times that of other 'larger' Scottish teams. 2 Secondly, the FBO was implemented in England and Wales to tackle the persistent problem of violence involving English hooligans abroad (Stott and Pearson, 2006) , whereas in Scotland -in the absence of any notable problems with followers of the national team (see Guilianotti, 2005) , the focus was on disorder at domestic club football , and in particular disorder related to sectarianism.
The issue of sectarianism 3 in Scotland has been the focus of much academic attention (see Bruce et al., 2004; Devine, 2000) and club football has long been associated with the problem (Flint & Powell, 2011) . Although sectarian allegiances have been observed with the supporters of several Scottish football clubs, the issue is most commonly linked to the 'Old Firm' of Rangers and Celtic (Bradley, 1995) . Within these clubs, sectarianism is centred on the British protestant heritage of Rangers and the Irish Catholic tradition of Celtic and commonly manifests itself in the display of banners and the singing of songs (Millward, 2009) . In academic circles, debates exist as to whether the Old Firm rivalry should be understood in terms of being symptomatic of substantive sectarian hatred that reaches beyond the confines of football or as merely ritualised forms of abuse intended to 'wind-up' rival supporters (Bruce et al., 2004 This paper examines the implementation of FBO legislation in Scotland and England by utilising data collected as part of a Scottish Government-commissioned evaluation. 4 The evaluation sought principally to explore the operation of banning order legislation in Scotland, and through comparative analysis of the legislative process in England revealed a number of findings that are pertinent both to the control of football related disorder and policy transfer. The paper begins by describing the development of the FBO legislation in England and Scotland, and it outlines the backdrop to the evaluation. Patterns of FBO imposition are then compared, and we consider a number of explanations for the differences that are observed. Overall, the paper identifies that key differences in how the legislation has been driven and resourced across the two jurisdictions has resulted in a low use of civil orders in Scotland with the focus being on the imposition of orders upon conviction. However, we argue that in light of the perceived recent increase in sectarian disorder in Scottish football, this relatively restrained use of the orders could be superseded by a more draconian regime, pushed by an increasingly assertive Scottish Government intent on making its mark on criminal justice issues.
The development of Football Banning Order legislation
The incremental development of FBOs in England and Wales has been well covered, notably in the work of Pearson (2006, 2008) . Prior to the Football (Disorder) Act of 2000, which introduced FBOs in their current form, attempts at to ban hooligans from matches had gathered momentum from the early 1980s onwards (Stott and Pearson, 2006; Frosdick and Marsh, 2005) .
Early attempts to control match attendance focussed on preventing fans from travelling abroad to attend fixtures through the imposition of 'restriction orders' that compelled individuals to surrender their passports for a limited period either side of specified matches (Stott and Pearson, 2006) .
However, these orders could only be imposed on the back of a criminal conviction and it was often difficult to secure convictions against some hooligans (James and Pearson, 2006) . FBOs were therefore introduced in the Football (Offences and Disorder) Act 1999 and the Football Disorder Act (2000), extending existing powers in three key respects:
1. FBOs could be targeted at stopping troublemakers from attending specified regulated domestic football matches for an extended period of up to ten years (provisions for surrendering passports prior to international matches were retained). Whilst FBO's imposed through these new civil powers were less restrictive than FBOs issued on the back of a conviction (with the maximum period of any ban being three years compared to ten years on conviction), the provisions still caused controversy. As with ASBOs, the ability to impose significant restrictions on an un-convicted individual's freedom of movement or association, and the ability to then criminalise them for failure to comply with such restrictions -were widely criticised as disproportionate (Pearson, 2002 This may reflect a reluctance by policy makers at the time to encroach on the autonomy of the Scottish Judiciary. Scotland has a distinct legal system, and pre-devolution professionals within this system enjoyed -unlike their counterparts in England and Wales -relative freedom from scrutiny or interference by politicians in Westminster (Tombs, 2008 White and Willock (2007) . 9 We use the term 'regime' here as it best denotes the network of institutional resources, formal policies and guidelines that were put in place in support of the legislation. It was against this background that in 2010 the Scottish Government commissioned an evaluation to examine the progress of the FBO legislation to date. There was an over-arching concern that the FBO legislation in Scotland was not being effectively utilised and the evaluation aimed to identify whether this perceived under-utilisation was due to poor awareness and processes, or whether it was due to active and principled resistance to the legislation. In examining these questions the evaluation had a comparative element, looking at the experience of implementing the legislation in England and Wales.
The evaluation was broadly divided into two inter-related parts, the first looking at how cases were identified and processed by the police, the second looking at how cases were then subsequently dealt with in court. The first part of the research (the role of the police in targeting FBOs) is the primary focus of this paper. In order to address the research questions, the methodology focused on a multi-site case study approach both in Scotland and in England and Wales. The logic behind this approach was that it would allow the research team to examine the practices underpinning the 10 To put this in context, when the FBO legislation was being drafted it was estimated that -after a slow initial ). In addition, interviews were conducted with club officials, officials from the Scottish Football Association and the Scottish Premier League, prosecutors (known in Scotland as 'procurator fiscal deputes') and the judiciary. The purpose of the interviews was not only to elicit an account of how practitioners understood and used the legislation, but also to contextualise this use against the backdrop of the particular characteristics of football disorder in their area. Interviews were supplemented with attendance at various FBO-related training events, as well as qualitative and quantitative analyses of electronic case records, and police incident and conviction data.
14 The timing of the research was fortuitous, with fieldwork largely preceding the controversial events of the 2010-11 Scottish football season, the evaluation thereby benefitting from unimpeded access and co-operation.
For the Scottish Government the value in having a comparative approach was conceived in a fairly conventional manner, principally that lessons might be learnt from practices in England and Wales.
However, practitioners are themselves active in learning comparative lessons from other sites and institutions (Bloor, 1997) , and as evaluators we rapidly found that Scottish practitioners were fully appraised of innovations in practices and policies South of the border. This should not have been surprising, for in spite of certain structural differences 15 and a strong rhetorical emphasis on the 'Scottishness' of Scottish policing (Gorringe and Rosie, 2010) , there are, in reality, very strong institutional links between police forces North and South of the border, with a fluid interchange of policies, practices and personnel (Donnelly and Scott, 2005) . However, the comparative, case studybased approach to the work nevertheless threw up more subtle lessons regarding how FBO practices varied in different settings.
The cross-border interconnections are obviously by necessity fairly dense when it comes to the policing of football. This is an operational requirement when Scottish clubs frequently play their English and Welsh counterparts in pre-season friendlies and European fixtures, and when sets of fans have cross-border allegiances and rivalries (Dunning et al., 1986) . However, these interconnections also have a historical basis in terms of the development of policies and practices designed to address the issues of safety and security at football. In particular, certain key events in each jurisdiction have been seen as a catalyst for changes to security governance in both jurisdictions (e.g. the Ibrox disaster in 1902, the Ibrox disaster of 1971, the Bradford City Stadium fire in May 1985; and the Hillsborough disaster of 1989).
Contrasting implementation: Numbers of FBO's issued in Scotland compared to England & Wales
Once the legislation had bedded in, the key question was why there was such a large disparity in the average numbers of orders issued in Scotland compared to England and Wales. A retort at the time might have been that the disparity wasn't problematic given the calm that had come to characterise crowd behaviour in Scottish football. Amongst evaluation respondents, there was a consensus that Scotland had been enjoying a downward trend in football-related violence and disorder. This was partly attributed to a decline in the size and activity of some notorious hooligan groups, but other factors were also deemed important. The commercial success of Scottish Premier League football in terms of record season-ticket sales (Ellen, 2010) had leant a certain stability and predictability to match days, with supporters and officials alike broadly well-drilled in what to expect and how to behave 16 . Season ticket sales were also seen to strengthen controls as ticket-holders attending home matches were identifiable via allocated seats inside stadia. However, England and Wales had also been enjoying similar clement conditions, so these factors alone cannot account for the low take-up of FBOs in Scotland.
There are other background factors unique to Scotland that may, at least partially, account for these differences. This might include the lack of opportunity for fans to cause high-profile trouble abroad
given the comparative lack of success of Scottish clubs in international tournaments. Moreover, whereas English fans have acquired a reputation for violence 17 , the Tartan army (supporters of the Scottish National Team) had decided that the best way to outshine the English, was not to outdo them in 'thuggery', but to cultivate a contrasting reputation for being 'not hooligans but friendly fans' (Giulianotti 2005: 292 The reputation of English fans may certainly have driven the demand for FBOs, though this has been against a backdrop of a significant reduction in recent year of violence involving England (see Stott & Pearson, 2006 However, on closer inspection of English and Scottish figures, the contrast between the two jurisdictions becomes less marked. In particular, if one considers FBO performance in terms of the rate of FBOs issued per 1,000 spectators, the gap between the top clubs in the Premiership and the top clubs in the SPL narrows considerably. This can be seen in table 1 which compares rates for the six clubs with the highest average attendances in the two divisions. There are two key observations to be made here. The first is that, far from banning rates being of another order of magnitude in the Premiership -as a simple reading of FBO figures might lead us to expect -rates of FBO use are similar for several clubs in the SPL. Second, there are wide disparities between clubs in terms of banning order rates. These disparities are as notable within the two divisions as they are across the two divisions, suggesting that the use of FBOs is significantly mediated not only by differences between the two national jurisdictions, but also by factors operating at a more local level.
The notion that there is any linear relationship between levels of attendance and the rate of issued The most straight forward explanation for these patterns would be that, relative to the number of spectators, there are more problems of disorder in lower league matches in England and Wales.
However, Home Office figures from the 2009-10 season (Table 2) casts doubt on this explanation.
Whilst the police arrest people with a remarkable degree of consistency across the four divisions (relative to the average number attending a given match), the rate at which FBOs are issued per 1,000 spectators rises consistently as one drops down the divisions. Furthermore, an analysis of the type of offences leading to arrests showed no marked differences between leagues that might help explain the greater propensity for issuing FBOs in lower leagues (e.g. if offences in lower leagues were markedly more serious this might account for any difference). Given that there appears to be no startling inverse relationship between disorder and the size of a football crowd these findings need explanation. The findings look even more peculiar when one considers the equivalent Scottish picture, where lower division clubs accounted for hardly any FBOs. 20 There are unquestionably limits to the value of arrest figures in terms of fully reflecting the threat posed from hooligans. In instances where trouble from risk supporters is routinely organised well away from football stadia, any incidents of trouble will not be included in match day statistics. However, there is no credible evidence to suggest that this type of hooliganism is disproportionately associated with teams in the lower English divisions. One alternative hypothesis might be that fans of lower league clubs follow the English national team in proportionately greater numbers, and are therefore more likely to be targeted with FBOs.
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The most plausible explanation for these findings is a key difference in how FBOs are administered and promoted in England and Wales. In Scotland, the expense of applying for and administering FBOs is entirely borne by the criminal justice agencies involved. This applies both to applications made on the back of criminal convictions and those made using civil powers (termed 'summary applications' in Scotland). Contrastingly, in England and Wales funding for specific 'football related' posts (such as Banning Officers), and pump-priming monies to help police forces pursue civil FBO applications, are provided by the UK Football Policing Unit 21 . As a consequence, informal quotas are set from area to area before the start of each season, and these would appear to artificially inflate the volume of FBO applications in the lower leagues. This links in with the broader theme of resourcing, to which we will return.
Effective processes
Even after accounting for attendance levels and financial incentives, there is still a performance gap to account for between the two jurisdictions. Whilst during the 2009-10 SPL season -in a sample of five forces 22 where complete figures were available 53% of all football-related convictions where an FBO request was made successfully resulted in an FBO being issued, the comparable figure for
England and Wales was reportedly in the region of 80% (Hamilton-Smith et al., 2011:11). In Scotland, our research examined whether this was down to deficiencies in terms of identifying suitable FBO subjects 23 or weaknesses in terms of how cases were subsequently handled through the criminal justice process.
On both sides of the border, the processes observed were robust and broadly identical. This is unsurprising given the aforementioned inter-connectedness of approaches for managing football security. In both jurisdictions there are professionalised police 'match commanders' who have 21 The UKFPU was set up in 2005. Part of its remit is to monitor the use of banning orders and to help manage and support their administration. 22 Strathclyde, Northern, Tayside, Fife and Dumfries and Galloway 23 A 'suitable subject' may be taken to mean here either an individual charged with a serious football-related offence (particularly if they have previous convictions for similar offences) or individuals who were deemed 'risk supporters' namely those who were believed to be a member of a 'hooligan group'.
overall responsibility for match-day security, and both police and club officials seek guidance on match-day safety and security from a shared source: the Football Licensing Authorities' "Guide to Whilst procedures were similar on paper, and whilst there was general agreement as to the sorts of behaviour that typically merited an FBO application (a violent incident involving a repeat offender), there were occasional decisions that invited disagreement amongst Scottish practitioners.
"young lad, got a wee bit excitable [….] a goal celebration, he's ran on to the pitch, and before he's realised what he's done the police are on him, very apologetic, didn't make any contact, no previous convictions […]it's an ideal opportunity for a bit of common sense, it could have been approached based on its merits, but as is, pitch incursion, football banning order request put in and based on the circumstances he's been given a football banning order for twelve months […]might have been a bit harsh." Scottish Football Intelligence Officer A
However, an analysis of a sample of Scottish conviction data and electronic court records demonstrated broadly consistent decision-making. Those receiving an FBO on conviction were significantly more likely to have an existing criminal record than individuals who were convicted of a similar football-related offence but did not receive an FBO. They were also significantly more likely to have had a previous conviction for a violent and/or a football-related offence (Hamilton-Smith et al., 2011: 15) . Finally, when detailed court records relating to the index offence were examined, cases where FBOs were issued were more likely to involve comparatively serious violence, or 24 The National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) was formed in April 2007 to improve public safety through the provision of critical national services, building capability across the police service and providing professional expertise to police forces and authorities. 25 The Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland (ACPOS) is a professional body for police leadership. It works in partnership with government to set strategic objectives for policing in Scotland.
behaviour in a football ground that was deemed particularly dangerous (e.g. throwing flares).
Reportedly, FBOs on conviction were targeted at similar types of offenders in England and Wales (Hamilton-Smith et al., 2011: 45) .
Superficially, the use of civil 14B orders (or in Scotland, civil summary applications) also looks similar, In England, the interviews with police officers revealed that 14B FBO were almost exclusively focussed on individuals believed to be 'risk supporters'; individuals who associated with -or belonged to -'hooligan' groups that sort out confrontation with rival groups of fans. 26 In Scotland, with little use made of the available civil powers, the focus on risk supporters was more opportunistic. Whether FBOs on conviction were a useful tool in tackling hooliganism depended on whether they were caught being engaged in violence in a way that could clearly be related to football. Whilst some Scottish hooligan 'firms' have always had a clear interest in both violence and actively supporting their club (e.g. the Aberdeen casuals), other groups of hooligans have a reputation for displaying a measure of indifference to football, rarely attending games, and often preferring (in the case of Celtic) to spend match days in a pub, or attempting to seek out disorder in areas well away from football stadia (a feature of the Hibernian risk supporters). The difficulties that such loose associations present are twofold:
• First, if disorder does occur, it is often in a context -and at a time (away from the match, and after a match day police operation has wound down) -that makes it unlikely that the police will either make the connection to football, or will be able to convincingly evidence that connection in court.
• Second, even if such a connection is successfully evidenced -FBOs as typically issued in Scotland -tend to focus narrowly on simply banning fans from stadia. In the absence of FBOs with additional conditions (for instance banning individuals from congregating in certain geographical areas on match days) the utility of such orders was questioned: Football Intelligence Officer C Another likely disincentive to apply for conditions was that most Scottish FBO requests were based on only basic offence information. Forces rarely resourced the compilation of more detailed packages of evidence and intelligence that could demonstrate how an individual's bad behaviour or disreputable associations away from a football game were nevertheless plausibly linked to football.
This contrasts with England, where intelligence packages were routinely prepared for risk supporters. This touches on what proved to be the key difference in explaining the performance gap between the two jurisdictions. Whilst processes in both jurisdictions were broadly the same, the resources available to support the implementation of the FBO legislation were very different.
The resourcing of the banning order legislation
In England and Wales the administration of FBOs and the collation and coordination of intelligence This level of resourcing is in stark contrast to the situation that pertained in Scotland during our Evaluation. Here, a single civilian officer held the national responsibility for coordinating FBOs. The individual had no budget to support force-level activity, and no support from seconded police staff.
There was no capacity for the central coordination or collation of intelligence. Meanwhile, whilst most SPL clubs had a dedicated Football Intelligence Officer (FIO), the posts were normally part-time. A number of interviewed FIOs described the time available to dedicate to this role as highly limited, often less than a day a week. These limited resources impacted on the comparable effectiveness of Scottish processes in four ways:
1. Football-related arrests made well away from a match, or outside the period when the match day operation was running, ran the risk that the arresting officer might not flag-up that the arrest was football-related or be aware of the option to seek an FBO. Even if officers knew to ask for an FBO, they didn't always couch requests in a manner that persuasively linked the incident to football, or evidenced the impact of the incident on the victim. FIO's attempted to counter this by scanning arrests on match days across a wider area, quality checking FBO requests that were made. But most also admitted that they had limited capacity to do this.
2. Limited capacity also curtailed opportunities to develop intelligence or risk supporter profiles on the back of offences that were identified.
3. Even where profiles were available funding for using those profiles to apply for civil summary applications was not normally available.
4. Limited FIO resource had a knock-on effect in terms of the quality of communications with partner agencies in the criminal justice system. In particular, whereas colleagues in England frequently liaised with the Crown Prosecution Service to discuss cases, and attended court to follow proceedings and provide expert testimony where helpful, face to face liaison in Scotland was rare, and usually case-files were sent up to prosecutors with no additional communication. Case files were often not that detailed and police officers usually had no opportunity to explain in person the significance of cases with prosecutors, or to follow-up failed requests in order to understand why orders weren't granted. This was important, because in practice prosecutors and the judiciary often had limited awareness of the relevance or content of the FBO legislation, leading to FBO requests either being 'discarded' by prosecutors, or being poorly presented or misunderstood in court.
Consequently the resources available for implementing the FBO legislation in Scotland impacted on who was targeted by that legislation and how effectively cases were progressed, with clear-cut instadia incidents appearing to be more likely to result in an FBO. However, the types of incidents that the legislation in Scotland was specifically intended to tackle, namely incidents of sectarian disorder, were often less clear cut. As a result, individuals convicted of sectarian disorder were less likely to receive an FBO than those convicted of violent offences. 28 The police and football clubs alike have faced accusations in the past of turning a blind eye to sectarian behaviour in football (Moorehouse, 2006) . There is evidence, however, that many clubs have been proactive in trying to deal with sectarianism. For example, Flint and Powell (2009: 199) 
note that as recently as 2003
Rangers took action to minimise the visibility of sectarian identities through 'proscribing legitimate banners such as Union flags and Saltires'. Despite this, from our interviews with police officers and club officials it was clear that, whilst united in condemnation of sectarian behaviour, they held very mixed views on the practicality of using FBO legislation to target it.
Sectarian offences that involved insult rather than actual violence threw up a range of practical and legal challenges. Proving that an insult is sectarian is not straightforward. Most knowledgeable fans are aware of the songs or flags that are currently 'proscribed' as sectarian under existing legislation, and often simply adapt their insults to fall slightly outside of these categories (Howe, 2010) . Even if the insult can be proven as sectarian, many police officers were of the view that an FBO was unlikely to be granted unless one could prove that a) the offender was prominent in some way (e.g. a ringleader), and that b) the offender's actions caused 'alarm' or 'distress.' In the absence of these aggravating factors, it is more difficult to issue an FBO for sectarian insults than for offences 28 Sectarian offences constituted 19% of all banning orders issued on the back of criminal conviction between November 2006 and July 2010. Conversely, they made up 41% of all cases where a banning order was not issued on the back of conviction (see Hamilton-Smith et al., 2011: 14) involving some form of violent conduct. Key to successfully prosecuting many of these offences therefore was inserting surveillance into the stadia to identify individuals, and to clearly record the nature and impact of their behaviour. At the time of the evaluation however, resources for conducting proactive surveillance operations were very limited.
Discussion
Superficial comparisons of the use of FBO legislation in Scotland and England & Wales are misleading. The comparative use of orders 'on conviction' in Scotland is not nearly as low as headline figures would suggest, whilst civil summary applications are -in effect -hardly used at all.
Thus, if we re-visit the criticism of FBOs made by Stott and Pearson (2006; , the Scottish position would appear to be one of admirable moderation, with orders being used sparingly for the most appropriate cases of violence and disorder, where guilt is proven to a criminal standard in a court of law, and where restrictions rarely infringe on a recipient's liberties beyond a ban from football grounds. Such an account may certainly please advocates of Scottish judicial independence and restraint. However, our research suggests that this restraint is driven as much by considerations of economy as of due process. Whilst there was principled resistance amongst some respondents to the excessive use of FBO powers, it must be noted that reservations were expressed by criminal justice practitioners in England as well.
The main point that comparative work in this area seems to illuminate, is a more general one, namely differences between two jurisdictions in terms of how legislation is introduced and 'driven'.
Common security needs and inter-dependencies can recommend uniformity in the framing of many areas of criminal justice policy and legislation (Keating et. al., 2003) yet there is often divergence in the detail of how policies and laws are actually implemented (Mooney and Poole 2004; Nixon et al., 2010) . Policy making and legislation in Scotland is traditionally less centralised, and more mediated by the professional autonomy of public sector and legal professionals, whilst legislation is less driven by targets and performance indicators (Keating et al., 2003) . As devolution has developed, this characterisation of Scottish policy making as being weak at the centre and largely 'bottom-up' has been qualified by commentators observing a gradual centralisation of powers at the expense of local autonomy and professional independence (Parry 2002) . In Scottish criminal justice in particular, a sphere traditionally resistant to the punitive policies of Westminster (McAra, 2008) , it has been argued that an ironic consequence of devolution is that criminal justice policy has in fact converged with the punitive policies of Westminster (Croall, 2006) . This may be precisely because the independence of the Scottish legal and criminal justice systems has provided Scottish politicians with a key area in which they can exert and demonstrate influence, courting the electorate with their own brand of popular punitivism (Scott, 2011) . , for communications that are perceived as threatening (those that intend to cause fear and alarm, implied threats or those intended to incite religious hatred). These proposals have attracted heavy criticism as being impractical and excessively draconian -with maximum penalties being increased from a six month to a five year custodial sentence. In addition, the Act extends the use of FBOs through the creation of a new offence 'offensive behaviour at a regulated football match', for which an FBO can be sought in every case. 31 Alongside these new powers, significant extra resources have been earmarked for supporting the administration of FBOs in Scotland, in particular increasing the capacities and capabilities of prosecutors and the police.
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To some critics, the Act represents little more than a moral panic, with legislation being hastily drafted in response to a brief period of heightened tensions between the supporters of Scotland's two major football clubs 33 (Laver, 2011) . Certainly in the face of sustained tabloid media coverage and with parliamentary elections looming, Ministers were under pressure to be seen to act.
Nevertheless, it is also worth noting that the Government was responsive to some of the criticisms of the draft legislation, making limited concessions 34 and agreeing to review the legislation two years after its enactment. Whist the legislation may still appear potentially punitive, what it cannot be said to represent is a convergence with Westminster policies. The 2011 Act is a distinctly Scottish solution to a Scottish problem, though its inception also arguably conforms to the well-established thesis that the interaction of media coverage and electoral politics tends towards the production of punitive criminal justice policies (see Newburn and Jones 2005) . One key question therefore that stands prominently in the wake of recent events, is whether the 2011 Act marks the start of more politicised and punitive criminal justice policy making in Scotland, or whether Ministers will find a way to better balance the pressures of political accountability with maintaining many of the valued attributes of Scottish Criminal Justice.
